In their academic
paper entitled, Â“Private Circuits: Securing Hardware Against Probing Attacks,Â”
Yuval Ishai, Amit Sahai, and David Wagner raise the question, Could anyone
guarantee secrecy even if an adversary could eavesdrop
on someoneÂ’s brain? This question was prompted, say the authors, by
side-channel attacks that could give an adversary partial access to hardwareÂ’s
inner workings. Recent research has shown that side-channel attacks pose a very
serious threat to cryptosystems with embedded devices. The authors discuss how
to protect privacy by proposing
ways to build private circuits able to resist such attacks. This is a highly
Cracking; Eavesdrop; Privacy; Privacy Laws.
Ishai, Y. Sahai, A. and Wagner, D. Private Circuits: Securing Hardware Against
Probing Attacks. [Online, 2004.] University of California at Berkeley Computer
Science Department Website.